Sources of Security
Julie Shapiro*
Much of the discussion of the Sexually Violent Predators
has been devoted to a debate over whether the Act poses
various problems. The potential problems that the other commentators have identified can be divided into two groups. On
the one hand, we have problems, or at least arguable problems,
that are "fixable." That is, if we all agreed that they were
problems, we could fix them. On the other hand, we have
those problems that are not fixable.
Most problems thus far discussed are fixable problems.
For example, if confusion exists about whether civil or criminal procedural rules apply, we could end the confusion by
explicitly selecting the appropriate rules or drafting new ones.
We might disagree on what those new rules should be, but we
should all agree that we could certainly solve the problem of
being uncertain about which rules apply. Similarly, if we are
unclear about whether a jury must be unanimous, and if that
uncertainty is a problem, we could decide that question and
clarify the statute accordingly.2
The fixable problems relating to the specifics of the statute thus do not raise the hardest questions that a statute like
this one presents precisely because they are fixable. If I agreed
that the general idea of the statute was a good one, I still might
find the specifics of this statute unacceptable. But I would be
able to propose an acceptable statute that accomplished the
same basic purpose. Thus, although the specifics of this statute
are of enormous importance to the legal questions pending in
the courts and to those who must litigate under the statute, the
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2. I do not suggest that the question of whether the statute ought to require a
unanimous jury is an easy one to resolve. It is one on which there has been
disagreement among the commentators. Thus, whether we required a unanimous jury
or not, dissenters would still assert that the choice reflected in the statute was wrong.
But in my view, the statute would remain "fixable" because if the dissenters could
convince a majority of the decision-makers that their position was correct, the

dissenters' concerns would be satisfied.
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specifics are not essential to the most difficult problem posed
by this Act. Rather than focus on the specifics of this particular Act, I will direct my comments to the dilemma inevitably
posed by any statute like this: can the government acceptably
imprison individuals based on a prediction of future
dangerousness?
I must begin my consideration by observing that at least
two problems are presented by virtually any statutory scheme
aimed at identifying and imprisoning individuals based on predictions of how they will behave in the future. First, we cannot with complete accuracy identify those individuals who are
dangerous, and second, the unusual decision-making process
will inevitably be skewed in favor of incarceration. Taken
together, these two problems ensure that we will end up incarcerating some who are not in fact dangerous.
As to the first of these problems, although the other commentators disagree about how accurately dangerousness can be
predicted and although some current research may suggest
that we can be somewhat more accurate than past studies have
suggested, no one has asserted that we can predict dangerousness flawlessly or even with a very high degree of accuracy.
Further, no one has advanced the claim that at any time in the
foreseeable future we will be able to do so. This leads, of
course, to two conclusions. First, we will inevitably detain
some people who are not in fact dangerous. These are "false
positives." Second, we will release some people who are in fact
dangerous. These are "false negatives." Even the most optimistic and faithful of the advocates of this statute, or any statute like it, must acknowledge that we will err on both sides of
the line.
The second future dangerousness problem that the Washington statute presents is that we ask a fact-finder to make a
decision unlike those decisions we expect fact-finders to make
elsewhere in the criminal or civil justice system. Rather than
asking the finder of fact, which is typically a jury, to determine
what happened in the past, we ask that it tell us what will happen in the future. Although in a technical legal sense the factfinder must determine that some doubt exists about whether
the defendant poses a risk of harm in the future in order to
conclude that the individual is not a sexual predator, in a practical sense the fact-finder must offer us a personal assurance
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that the defendant is "safe."3 In order to make an informed
determination, the fact-finder must be advised of the terrible
crimes that the defendant has committed in the past. Having
been advised of the cruelty that the defendant has been capable of in the past, even the most conscientious fact-finder,
whether judge or jury, will often choose to ensure the safety
of the community rather than assume personal responsibility,
even for what may be a very small risk.4 Given this choice,
many fact-finders inevitably will err on the side of
incarceration.
This problem may at first seem most severe when the factfinder is a jury; it could thus seemingly be resolved by simply
assigning fact-finding in these cases to judges. But surely an
elected judge, as state judges in Washington are, is at least
equally susceptible to pressures to err on the side of safety.
One can easily imagine that even unelected judges with life
tenure might well hesitate before determining, in a close case,
to release a person who might be dangerous. The apparent
effect of this pressure is to skew the process towards incarceration. Thus, false positives will be multiplied while false negatives, to some extent, may be minimized.5
These observations lead to the conclusion that statutes of
this kind will necessarily lead to the incarceration of people
who are not in fact dangerous. Also, perhaps to a lesser
degree, such statutes will only imperfectly achieve their
purpose of detaining those who are dangerous. This result recreates the moral dilemma with which we began: can we
acceptably adopt a system that will incarcerate innocent and
harmless people in order to imperfectly protect ourselves from
dangerous people?
3. This question may bear some resemblance to questions that must be faced by
judges at sentencing or by parole boards, but it is not one generally presented to a jury.
And, given the modern trend towards determinate sentencing, it is a question that is
asked less frequently of judges and parole boards.
4. The problem of erring in favor of incarceration is more striking in the Sexually
Violent Predators Act because the Act requires that the jury must find, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the defendant is a sexually violent predator. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 71.09.060(1) (Supp. 1990-91). Even assuming the standard of proof is a problem,
however, it is a "fixable" problem.
5. The prosecution has won all of the cases brought to trial to date. John Q. La
Fond, Washington's Sexually Violent Predator Law: A Deliberate Misuse of the
TherapeuticStatefor Social Control, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 665 (1992). Although
this could be because prosecutors have carefully selected only the strongest cases, the
result is at least equally consistent with the hypothesis that, when in doubt, juries will
err on the side of incarceration.
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Although I do not propose to resolve this question, I would
now like to turn to two problems generated by the statute that
are not "fixable." First, the statute perpetuates the notion that
we should lock up those who threaten us; and second, the statute ignores culture's influence upon sexual offenders. Both
problems weigh against adoption of such a statute.
Any statute like the Sexually Violent Predators Act perpetuates the notion that the source of our safety, as individuals
and as communities, is in confining those who threaten us.
Surely this is not true. As a society, we incarcerate a larger
proportion of our population than any other country in the
world. Indeed, in 1990, our incarceration rate was 455 people
per 100,000; this number represents an increase of 6.8% from
1989.6 Yet this has not made us safe. Also, the rise in rates of
incarceration over the last five years has not brought with it
safer cities and towns. We cannot hope to obtain security and
safety as individuals or as communities simply by locking people up. Although incarceration may be the appropriate
response to some forms of antisocial behavior, it cannot be our
primary response. Security will be found in responsible, organized communities and in each of us taking responsibility in our
neighborhoods and for our neighbors.
This perspective on the sources of security was not ignored
in the package of reforms adopted after the Shriner case. One
provision that the legislature adopted ensures appropriate community notification when an identified individual is to be
released into the community.7 This provision allows the community to take responsible, collective actions to protect its
members. Yet as far as I can determine, we pay much less
attention to these provisions than to those that permit incarceration. Thus, the tremendous potential of the Act for
increasing the safety of our communities through creative individual and community responses goes largely unrealized while
substantial resources are devoted to achieving and maintaining
the long-term incarceration of fourteen "sexually violent
8
predators."
6. Fox Butterfield, US. Expands Its Lead in the Rate of Imprisonment, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 11, 1992, at A16. This rate is ten times higher than those of Japan,
Sweden, Ireland, and the Netherlands. Id. The American rate is also somewhat
higher than that of South Africa. Id.
7. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.120 (Supp. 1990-91).
8. La Fond, supra note 5, at 701. It is difficult to know how to interpret the fact
that to date only 14 individuals have been incarcerated under the Act. On one hand, to
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Ironically, in relying heavily on incarceration, the statute
may render us more vulnerable. Because we rely on the false
notion that we can make ourselves safe by identifying the right
people and locking them away, we do not take the steps necessary to develop secure communities. We fail to develop adequate protections against the people whose danger cannot be
foreseen: the false negatives of the world. Further, when the
individuals who are identified as sexual predators are released
into our communities (a circumstance which must be possible
because the defendants are not sentenced to life in prison) will
we know how to protect ourselves? In order for sexual offenders to be re-integrated into communities safely, community
security mechanisms must be in place. Yet our reliance on,
and our misplaced faith in, incarceration as a primary means of
attaining security prevents us from developing these
mechanisms.
In short, the assumption embedded in the statute that we
can be safe if we can only lock the right people away is false.
It is a false assumption that obscures from us the actions we
must take to build a safer society.
The second point that weighs against endorsement of the
Act as a way to address the problems of sexual violence is also
bound up with the assumptions that support the Act. The Act
apparently assumes that the violence it seeks to address is the
product of illness and not of culture. Even assuming this is
true in the case of the very specific individuals targeted by the
Act, the message of the Act is that this is more generally true.
This message stops us from questioning the relationship
between the violence in our culture, particularly violence
against women and children, and the violence on our streets.
We may obtain some comfort by pointing to individuals who
can inflict horrifying injuries on others, saying: "They are not
like us"; "they are sick"; "they suffer a disease." Yet in doing
so we absolve ourselves of any responsibility for their "sickthe extent that concerns exist about nondangerous individuals being incarcerated, one
may gain some comfort from the fact that so few individuals are incarcerated. After
all, even if the rate of false positives is 50%, only seven nondangerous people are
presently incarcerated. On the other hand, when the incarceration provisions of the
Act have been used in so few cases, one may find it hard to believe that the provisions
have actually increased the safety of the citizens of Washington in any meaningful
way. Certainly I do not feel safer walking the streets at night knowing that there are
14 (assuming all are correctly identified) fewer dangerous criminals lurking in the
shadows.
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ness." And in doing that, we may cut ourselves off from the
potential understanding of the problem and of the solution.
We are all immersed in a culture replete with images of
violence and of degradation of women and children. This
much is readily apparent in our magazines, television, movies,
music, and advertising. These images are reflected, perhaps, in
the prevalence of domestic violence and child abuse. One cannot adequately analyze these cultural problems by saying simply that the perpetrators of sexual crimes are sick. If sexual
offenders are sick, societal illness afflicts them at least in part.
We will not be able to cure this illness until we as individuals
take responsibility for our culture, acknowledge the power of
its images, and insist that they change. Here again, the Sexually Violent Predators Act may actually hamper change
because it provides us with a simple, exculpatory explanation
that these people are sick and that we are not responsible for
this sickness. In doing so, the Act discourages or misdirects
efforts to bring changes that might result in enhanced safety
and security.
The problems of incarceration and cultural influence share
a common theme: the messages the Act conveys, as well as the
Act itself, are problematic. Indeed, the Act conveys clear
messages that security is attained through incarceration and
that the people who commit crimes against women and children are isolated, ill individuals. These messages are too simplistic and too easy to accept. They allow us to stop
questioning the sources of security and violence in our society,
and they hamper us in our search for real solutions.

